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TJie unselfish, altruistic behavior of insect societies can be explained by way ofunusually
close genetic relatedness, while the cooperative behavior of chimpanzee and other distantly
related mammalian social groups resultsfrom their daily, social "fit-for-tat" trading offavors.
These sociobioiogical explanations, however, are inadequate to explain altruistic behavior
among human groups with tnembers numbering in the thousands or millions, groups consisting
for the most part of genetically unrelated individuals with little or no daily social contact.
Religion, cultural evolutionary theory suggests, may be the glue that binds them together.
AltiTiism is the unselfish concern for oth-
ers, especially at the expense of ones own
well-being. Altruistic behavior among animals
seems, however, to run counter to the theory
of evolution. How could the genes for alim-
istic behavior be selected for and propagated
down through the generations when such be-
havior is an expensive disadvantage to those
who possess it— it diminishes their chances of
sui^vival. their fitness? William Hamilton re-
solved this dilemma with his concept of "in-
clusive fitness." From a gene's point of view,
Hamilton suggested, what counts is being
propagated down through the generations, not
who specifically does the propagation.' Par-
ents, obviously, share genes with their off-
spring, and one can see how it might pay, from
an evolutionary viewpoint, for parents to aid
their children's survival, even at the expense
of their own, at times. Stories of parents—
particularly mothers— sacrificing their lives to
save their childi'en are legendar>'. What is not
so obvious is that sacrificial or altruistic be-
havior benefiting a sister, cousin, or other rela-
tive could, under the right circumstances, also
be evolutionarily advantageous, and therefore
preferentially selected generation after genera-
tion. Ants, for instance, are noted for their
sacrificial altruistic behavior in the numerous
wars between their colonies.
The workers iu ant colonies, sisters all,
are unusually closely related to each other and
to their mother queen due to a quirk in the
ant's reproductive process.- Helping their
mother reproduce is, from a selfish genetic
viewpoint, more advantageous than having
their own offspring. As a result, worker ants
do not produce their own offspring, as a rule.
They pass their genes along indirectly by help-
ing—in concert with thousands or millions of
other sister-workers— their mother pass along
her genes. The entire group as a "superor-
ganism" is being selected by genetic evolu-
tionary forces. So. which ant groups aie be-
ing selected? and which fall by the evolution-
ary wayside?
The key to ant evolutionary success is
group size. WTien it comes to all-out warfare,
the larger group usually wins. It is a matter
of simple attrition arithmetic. The slaughter
ends when one of the two warring groups has
been totally decimated. Even with losses
about equal on both sides, it is the larger group
that still has more live ants in the end, and
they march unopposed into the loser's nest to
haul off their war booty.
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But to work together so effectively as a
group, ants need group identification. Lack-
ing flags, they achieve group soUdarit>' chemi-
cally: each ant colony has a different "smell."
To be effective in war. ants need to bring thou-
sands of warriors quickly into battle, and in-
dividual ants must be genetically programmed
to lay down their lives for the greater good of
the group in defense of the mother queen. Ant
colonies with such almiistic genes survive (are
selected) at the expense of those that lack such
genes. Although close genetic relatedness and
group selection via large-scale warfare may
explain altruistic behavior among the social
insects, it does not explain altruism among
groups of animals, such as baboon troops,
which include family groups and also outside
individuals unrelated to the others. Why
should these animals, often unrelated, go out
of their way to help each other?
To understand this behavior, a fonn of al-
truism has been proposed, often termed "tit-
for-tat." I may help you (even if you are not
genetically related to me) if I feel confident
that you will return my favor in the future.
When I have extra food and you are short, I
will give you some of mine; but 1 will expect
you to return the favor when the siaiation is
reversed. Tit-for-tat requires keeping track
of who owes favors to whom, as well as the
relative size of the favors. Tit-for-tat can be a
beneficial system for all concerned, but the
system of favors breaks down if cheaters (who
accept favors but do not return them) are al-
lowed to flourish. Thus, they must be pun-
ished and, in severe cases, banned.
Monkeys and apes might have evolved
unusually large brains for their body size be-
cause such brains are required to keep track
of the many tit-for-tat deals in their large so-
cial groups. Such intelligence has been la-
beled Machiavellian, and resembles human
politics in its complexity, as suggested by the
title of Frans de Waal's book. Chimpanzee
Politics: Power and Sex Among Apes. ^
Biological altruism, resulting from either
genetic relatedness or tit-for-tat behavior, is
the basis of animal social behavior and forms
the heart of the field of sociobiology, launched
by Edward O. Wilson, the noted mymiecolo-
gist (ant scientist) at Harvard, in the mid-
1970s. In The Insect Societies, he considered
sociality across the societies of ants, bees, ter-
mites, and social wasps, looking for common-
alities and differences. Having one of those
minds that insist on firmly placing his own
specialty witliin the context of the next higher
level. Wilson saw no reason to stop with the
sociality of insects, so proceeded onward and
upward to consider sociality across all life.
He named his broad look "sociobiology."''
However, as had numerous biologists be-
fore him. Wilson ran into difficulties when he
extended his biologicid reasoning to that most
troublesome of species. Homo sapiens. Spe-
cifically. Wilson thought his sociobiology
could and should serve as the basis for a new
human sociology, a suggestion few sociolo-
gists accepted, because sociobiology does not
really explain large-group behavior among
humans. For. in contrast to the closely re-
lated societies of insects, there is little genetic
relatedness in large-scale human societies.
Furthennore, while humans do have unusu-
ally large brains for their physical size, they
are not. computers or ledgers aside, able to
keep track, in a tit-for-tat sense, of the many
favors that individuals might owe them.
So how is the recent urban guise, from an
evolutionary perspective, to be explained?
How. via the forces and course of evolution,
could such a phenomenon have arisen? How
could an obscure primate have evolved in just
a few thousand years from a planet-wide
population of two or three milHon hunter-gath-
erers to ultra-social, ant-like, highly organized
groups now numbering in the billions? What
had sociobiology overlooked?
The answer lies in a theoretical difficulty
with Wilson's sociobiology: he failed to dis-
tinguish between medium-scale social group-
ings such as wolf packs, and large-scale, ul-
tra-social animal societies such as ant colo-
nies, termite nests, and human urban societ-
ies. Donald Campbell overcame this difficulty
with the concept of "ultrasociality." which he
suggested occurred in both large-scale insect
societies and human urban societies.^ Such
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societies are now often temied "superorgan-
isms." ^ Campbell suggested that while both
insect and human superorganisms had evolved
as groups rather than as individuals, the dif-
ference between them was that insect super-
organisms had evolved by way of genetic se-
lection rules, while human urban societies had
evolved by way of cultural selection niles.'
Although genetic evolutionary theory and
When I have extj-a food and you are
shorty I will give you some ofmine; but I
will expect you to return thefavor when
the situation is reversed. Tit-for-tat
requires keeping track of who owes
favors to whom, as well as the relative
size ofthe favors.
cultural evolutionary' theory share many simi-
larities, there are also fundamental differences
in how these two evolutionary mechanisms
operate, differences first noted by Charles
Darwin in The Descent of Ma)f and, more
recently, by Robert Boyd and Peter
Richerson.*^
The distinction between genetic and cul-
tural evolution is critical. As long as Homo
sapiens and their hominid ancestors existed
in small groups, comparable in size to those
of thier closest relatives, the chimpanzees,
then their behavior was explicable through so-
ciobiological (genetic) reasoning by way of
inclusive fitness (genetic relatedness) and tit-
for-tat social trading. However, as discussed
above, such sociobioiogical reasoning is in-
effective when it comes to explaining human
large-group behavior, i.e. groups numbering
in the thousands or even millions— groups
which sprang into existence in just a few thou-
sand years. Genetic evolution is quite slow
in humans, occurring over timescales of tens
of thousands of years or more, which makes
it difficult to see how civilizations could have
resulted from genetic evolution. Furthermore,
there is considerable genetic diffusion be-
tween human groups. Genetic group selec-
tion does not operate as effectively with hu-
man groups as it does with ant colonies, be-
cause the winning group usually absorbs the
losing group— genes and all. Although homi-
nid altruism, presumably, was initially
sociobiologically based, i.e.. similar to their
chimpanzee relatives, at some point in homi-
nid evolution cultural evolutionary selection
niles must have become dominant over ge-
netic evolutionary selection
rules. When did cultural
group selection begin shap-
ing the species in the direc-
tion of human superorgan-
isms?
The archeological
record suggests that, starting
some 40,000 years ago, hu-
man groups began symboli-
cally distinguishing them-
selves, one group from an-
other, via decorations. Such group-distin-
guishing identification was a necessary pre-
requisite to effective cultural group selection,
marking off what was being selected. For
cultural evolution to operate effectively, there
also had to be a group selection mechanism.
Among humans, as is the case with ants, this
mechanism was group warfare. Contrary to
the myth of the "peaceful savage," war ex-
isted well before the earliest civilizations."^
When a culturally-identified group was de-
feated at war, its genes continued on. but its
idcntit)'. its existence as a cultural group, was
often lost. Successful cultural groups, on the
other hand, grew by absorbing imsuccessful
groups. They occasionally split into two
groups (fission reproduction), and their cul-
tural stories and beliefs (proto-religions)
spread by way of cultural conquest.
With cultural group identification, selec-
tion, and reproduction in place, cultural evo-
lution (as opposed to genetic evolution)
quickly came to dominate the evolution of the
human species. The result should come as no
surprise: large, well-organized, and well-
anned groups with good internal cooperation
survived and grew. The members and genes
of the losing group were incorporated within
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the larger, vvimiiug groups, but the cuhural
ways of the losers, their weaker myths, their
less altruistic proto-religious were not. Thus.
there were strong cultural evolutionary pres-
sures for increased group size and close in-
ternal cooperation.'' The direction cultural
evolution took is clear: larger groups were
better.
Hunter-gatherers spread out over tens of
thousands of square miles could not form
large, cohesive groups: but with the advent
of agriculture, tmly large, concentrated groups
became possible. Cultural evolution rapidly
searched for, found, and strengthened those
cultural features that enhanced cooperation
within such large groups. These groups, num-
bering in the tens of thousands, were of ne-
cessity composed primarily of unrelated in-
dividuals. Holding such groups of unrelated
individuals together by way of coercion is
For a code ofmorality to work, it needs an
extra kick that other motivations lack.
The additional power arises by a natural
process in which believers project the
morality onto a deity (the All Powerful).
both difficult and inefficient. What was
needed was a moral code, an organized reli-
gion that would bind members together with
common myths and a shared worldview. Al-
truistic behavior could then emerge, even
though group members were unrelated and
could not expect direct tit-for-tat returns. But
how could such groups avoid accumulating
cheaters who accepted the benefits of group
membership but failed to contribute? What
these early moral codes needed for enforce-
ment, according to Kevin Sharpe, is a deity.
For a code of morality to work, it needs
an extra kick that other motivations lack. The
additional power arises by a natural process
in which believers project the morality onto a
deity (the All-Powerful). Group members,
then, believe in an independent and objective
moral code that is changeless and indepen-
dent of human conditions. It emanates from
something higher than and outside of them-
selves. Feeling this absolute moral "other"
as a force acting upon them, they follow its
moral dictates. They believe their deity re-
quires it of them, and they strive to obey it.'-
The notion of the Divine is cleverness it-
self. It is, perhaps, the greatest all-time dis-
covery of cultural evolution in its effort to
enable ant-like human superorganisms with-
out the necessity of excessive coercion. Ants,
if they had larger brains, would fully appreci-
ate the Golden Rule to treat others in your
group, stranger or not. as you treat yourself.
That is exactly what ants do.
Michael Ruse and Edward Wilson have
described morality as "an illusion fobbed off
on us by our genes to get us to cooperate....
It's a shared illusion of the human race."' '^
They miss the boat: It is himian culture, not
human genes, that have
evolved to compensate
for a total lack of ge-
netic preparedness for
living in groups num-
bered in the millions.
Cultural evolution, fu-
eled by the cohesive
power of religion, has
rocketed the human
species to planetary dominance in only ten
thousand years. By contrast it took genetic
evolution some fifty million years to bring
ants to their dominant position in the insect
world. Having devised a unique st>'le of al-
truism, humans have evolved into a "crude
superorganism," "* becoming the "chimpan-
zees who would be ants." '^ Ants may have
their fine-tuned superorganism genes, but
we've got rehgioni
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Endnotes:
1. See Hamilton's classic paper.
2. Haplodiploidy.
3. For support of the social brain hypoth-
esis, see Byrne. Dunbar, Parker and
McKinney; and Corballis and Lea. For chim-
panzee politics, see de Waal.
4. Wilson's Sociobiology is a classic. I pre-
fer the abridged edition.
5. Campbell's concept of ultrasociality
overcame the difficulty with E. O. Wilsons's
rather broad categorization of the more so-
cial animals.
6. Although the concept of urban humanity
as insect-like superorganisms is an old one,
its modern revival is primarily due to
Campbell. Recent expansions of Campbell's
concept include those by Genet, Richerson
and Boyd, and Wright.
7. The concept of cultural group selection
and its controversial history is treated at length
by Sober and Wilson.
8. Although Darwin's launching of biologi-
cal evolution is well known, his initiation of
the study of cultural evolution is less well
known and lay fallow for over a century.
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9. The modem revival of cultural evolution-
ary theory has been spearheaded by Robert
Boyd and Peter Richerson.
10. The "myth of the peaceful savage" has
been shown to be incorrect through anthro-




12. Sharpe. p. 127.
13. As quoted in Sharpe, p. 134.
14. The characterization of humanity as a
"crude superorgauism" is taken from
Richerson and Boyd.
15. The conceptialization of humanity as
the "chimpanzees who would be ants" is my
own. See Genet.
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